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BOOK REVIEW
CLEARING AWAY THE CARICATURE
A REVIEW OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
LA WYER: INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT
by Douglas W. Kmiec, New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1992. Pp 220. $45.95 hardcover.
As a Deputy and, later, as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of
Legal Counsel,' Douglas W. Kmiec played a critical role at the Department of
Justice. In The Attorney General's Lawyer: Inside the Meese Justice Department,2
Professor Kmiec candidly recounts the operations at the Meese Department of
Justice,3 focusing on the substance behind the Meese agenda and record.
Rather than a "kiss-and-tell" book of personal scandal, The Attorney
General's Lawyer examines segments of Kmiec's work at OLC, offering his
criticism of Congress, the judiciary and his own executive branch colleagues.
Following the course of the book, this review seeks to illuminate Kmiec's appraisal
of the Meese jurisprudence of original intent, the missing natural law component
of that doctrine, and the Reagan Administration's attempt to apply it.
The Attorney General's Lawyer also presents a balance to the image the
media and political opponents created of Meese's tenure against his record and
legacy. 4 To America, the Department's policies and achievements became incon-
sequential, obscured by a caricature. Through The Attorney General's Lawyer,
Professor Kmiec clears away the accusations and exaggerations about the man
and presents his record.
I. THE MEESE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
A. Original Intent and the Reagan Administration
President Ronald Reagan believed that government was too large and too
intrusive into the lives and business of America. Sharing Reagan's beliefs, Kmiec
identifies the "judicial attitudes that either lost sight of, or whole-heartedly
1. The Office of Legal Counsel [hereinafter OLCI maintains a low profile as an apolitical "elite
corps" of attorneys who advise the Attorney General on constitutional issues and settle legal and
ethics disputes within the executive branch. From the ranks of OLC heads have come two Supreme
Court Justices, Rehnquist and Scalia.
2. DOUGLAS E. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE DE-
PARTMENT (1992) [hereinafter TrE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER]. Douglas Kmiec is a Professor of
Law, University of Notre Dame Law School.
3. Edwin Meese III succeeded William French Smith as the United States Attorney General in
February of 1985 and served at that post until his resignation in July of 1988.
4. Accusations of media bias, resurfacing during the recent 1992 presidential election, plagued
press coverage of Meese. See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 198. See also
Elizabeth Kolbert, Maybe the Media DID Treat Bush A Bit Harshly, N.Y. TIMs, Nov. 22, 1992, §
4, at 3.
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disregarded, the limits placed on the federal government by the Constitution" 5
as formidable obstacles to a philosophy of limited government. To counteract
the judicial activism of the two previous decades, the Reagan Administration
adopted the jurisprudential doctrine of "original intent." '6
Crucial to Kmiec's task at OLC was the commitment to the jurisprudence
of an "original understanding" of the Constitution, supplemented by an appre-
ciation of that document's natural law foundation. The Attorney General's
Lawyer describes the original intent philosophy as a "return to 'first principles."'
7
These principles, expressed by Meese, are found in the words and text of the
Constitution. "The words of the Constitution matter because they are written
and they are law," writes Kmiec.8 According to original intent theory, the words
of the Constitution create and enumerate a carefully chosen form of government.
When interpreting the Constitution, the judiciary must therefore follow the
specific words of the Constitution. If the words are ambiguous, judges must
"interpret[ I and appl[y] [them] in a manner so as to at least not contradict the
Constitution itself. '"
Professor Kmiec addresses some of the common objections voiced against
Meese's call for a return to the "original understanding." 0 While conceding
some difficulty in using an "original intent" approach, Kmiec responds that none
of these "excuses" is sufficient or justified when employing original intent
doctrine properly." They are easily dismissed as efforts to avoid difficult decisions.
Kmiec similarly raises three alternative theories offered by contemporary
critics of "original intent."'' 2 According to Kmiec these theories generally seek to
disregard the Constitution's meaning and lend themselves to judicial activism
through the creation of new rights.
The first of the three alternatives cited in The Attorney General's Lawyer,
is "neutral principles."' 3 Rather than choosing a particular interpretation when
confronting a hard case, a judge should supplant the meaning of the words in
favor of neutral principles that "transcend the case before them.' 1 4 Kmiec,
critical of the judicial law-making, terms the "neutral principles" approach a
divergence from the Constitution without justification, despite its goals of equality
and removing the "result-oriented judge."' 5
5. Id. at 17. In fairness, the judicial activists would also claim the high ground of freeing
citizens from government intrusion by protecting and expanding civil liberties enumerated in the
Constitution.
6. For an alternative source on the original intent philosophy, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMiRICA (1990).
7. See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 18-21.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 19. In this way Kmiec styles Meese as a "direct descendant" of Chief Justice
John Marshall, who established the power of judicial review by the federal judiciary. See Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10. Respectively, the objections are: 1) the original intent is too difficult to determine; 2) some
terms are intentionally ambiguous; 3) that the words are without specific meaning, and perhaps most
critically 4) interpretation based on "original intent" may produce "undesired outcomes." THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 21-24.
11. Id. at 25.
12. See id. at 25-29.
13. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 25 (citing Herbert Wechsler, Toward
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Kmiec raises and criticizes a second alternative, "balancing." 1 6 Balancing
requires the Court to search for varying interests, weigh them, and then arrive
at a reasoned conclusion. Although the method appears acceptable and "conjures
up the statue of Justice," Kmiec dismisses this formula as "non-constitutional
and fanciful." 17 Recognizing the numerous instances of Supreme Court balancing
tests and multi-pronged analyses, Kmiec reconciles them by suggesting that the
tests hide the true source of these outcomes, the Court and not the law. As such,
balancing is "delusive" and serves only to justify reaching a desired outcome. 8
The third and, for Kmiec, most unpalatable alternative to original intent is
"noninterpretivism." This jurisprudence completely disregards "traditional sources
of interpretation altogether."' 9 Within this method of decision-making different
standards may replace the traditional constitutional interpretation methods. 20
Kmiec berates Professor Laurence Tribe, in particular, for his assertion that
the Court's role in making law is not limited by the Constitution. Tribe claims
the Constitution is "an intentionally incomplete, often indeterminate structure
for the participatory evolution of political ideals and governmental practices." 2'
Justifying broad judicial power because of the difficulty in constitutional inter-
pretation would, for Kmiec, permit the Court to "achieve political victories not
forthcoming from the democratic process.' '22 Kmiec's indulgence hits a critical
mass where Tribe's reliance on judicial activism to nudge on constitutional
development is fully extrapolated. This reliance would destroy a rule of law in
favor of a rule by "elite judges constrained only by their social and cultural
positions in making decisions." '23
Ironically, Kmiec finds the writings of Michael Perry, another noninterpre-
tivist, "useful not for their creation of yet another standard to substitute for
original intent," but rather to illustrate the major weakness in the original intent
theory expounded by Meese. 24 Namely, Perry queries what happens when the
positive law, even the Constitution, conflicts with morality. This question intro-
duces the missing element of -the original understanding doctrine, natural law
rights and precepts. Recognition of the Framers' belief in the natural law and
pre-existing natural rights resolves the potential conflict in the original under-
standing doctrine. 25
16. Id. at 26 (citing T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 988 (1987)).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 27.
20. These standards, raising the ire of Kmiec, include those advanced most prominently by Dean
Paul Brest of the Stanford Law School and Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe. See Paul Brest,
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980); LAURENCE
TRIBE, Preface to the First Edition, reprinted in AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW vii-viii (2d ed.
1988).




24. Id. at 29 (citing Michael Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional
Justification, 56 N.Y.U.L. REv. 278 (1981)).
25. Without an absolute belief in natural law morality, which presumably remains unchanged
from the time of the Framers, Kmiec's argument appears circular.
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B. Original Intent and the Natural Law
While natural law has fallen into the dustbin of American legal scholarship
over the course of this century, Professor Kmiec finds it the answer to the
weaknesses of interpretation by original understanding. Kmiec, and other legal
scholars 26 secure the Constitution and the jurisprudence of its Framers squarely
to a natural law heritage. From Thomas Jefferson's oft quoted Declaration of
Independence to the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution, Kmiec finds clear
evidence of natural rights and natural law reasoning in the Founders' discourse. 27
Natural law, as explained by Kmiec, "assumes that every person and every
thing has been created with an inherent or intrinsic nature and that no human
or positive law can supersede this nature. '2 Kmiec attributes this basis to the
Founders and suggests that the natural law forms an integral part of the original
intent method, grounding the Constitution to the understanding of rights derived
from objective truths of nature.
Significantly, for Kmiec, natural law objectivity restricts the function of the
judiciary and the "finding" of new rights through judge-made law. 29 If employing
natural law reasoning, a judge would be unable to introduce her own morality.
The court cannot second-guess the legislature, unless the enacted laws contradict
the Constitution or natural law precepts.30 The objectivity of natural law principles
proscribes such judicial activism." Importantly, for Kmiec, this proscription
precludes the discovery of rights in "penumbra" and "emanations," argued as
sources of the abortion and other "privacy" rights.32 Such rights could not exist,
since they conflict directly with the natural law principle of human preservation.
Despite Kmiec's persuasive discussion, the natural law failed to win many
supporters in the original intent camp, specifically Bork and Meese. Additionally,
Kmiec faults his colleagues at the Department for refusing to include natural law
in their originalist approach. 3  Politics and an aversion to natural law's religious
undertone may have precipitated this omission. Opponents of natural law also
26. Terry Brennan counters objections to the assertion of pre-existing natural rights with evidence
taken from the debates for the ratification of the Constitution. See Terry Brennan, Natural Rights
and the Constitution: The Original "Original Intent", 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 965 (1992).
27. See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 34-38.
28. See id. at 30. While not disclaiming his own religious beliefs, Kmiec maintains that the
natural law does not require religious convictions, but simply a recognition of the patterns and truths
inherent in nature.
29. Id. at 31 (citing Charles E. Rice, Some Reasons for a Restoration of Natural Law Jurispru-
dence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 539, 568 (1989)).
30. Kmiec does not hold that the natural law must completely displace adherence to positive
law. To the contrary, positive law is vital to the operations of society and puts flesh on the bones
of the natural law framework. As Kmiec quotes, "[F]acts change, and therefore laws must change
to form a reasonable relation to facts." THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 33
(quoting Harold R. McKinnon, The Doctrine of Natural Law Philosophy, I NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS 85, 98 (A. Scanlan ed. 1947)).
31. Since truths of nature can be perceived and through reason can form principles, natural law
becomes an ultimate backstop or default reasoning mechanism when the text of positive law,
Constitutional or statutory, conflicts or is ambiguous. See id. at 32-34.
32. Id. at 32 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a woman's right to terminate
pregnancy qualified by state restrictions permitted during the second and third trimesters) and Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)(refusing to create a privacy right for homosexual sodomy)).
33. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 38.
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often cite the use of natural law to affirm slavery in Dred Scott v. Sanford.3 4
Kmiec easily counters the objection and finds the reason why this decision was
wrongly decided. The Court ignored a natural law principle that "[a]ll men are
created equal," announced in the Declaration of Independence, which provided
the superior right to guide the Constitution.35 In their treatment of Dred Scott,
Bork and Meese, as originalists critical of natural law, maneuvered to avoid the
Constitution's clear references to the ownership of slaves, in order to show why
slavery is unconstitutional.3 6 Without natural law they faltered and injured their
case for original intent.3 7
II. APPLYING ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING ACROSS THE BOARD
Armed with the original intent jurisprudence of the Meese Justice Depart-
ment, the Reagan Administration set out to execute its agenda throughout its
enforcement matters. As matters of constitutional conflict fall to the work of
the OLC, Professor Kmiec often participated first-hand in the formulation of
controversial departmental positions. The Attorney General's Lawyer recounts
significant battles in the areas of governmental structure, social issues and ethics.
A. Governmental Structure
The Constitution provides for a tripartite form of federal government with
a system of checks and balances, and a reservation of power to the several states.
Asserting the system had changed from that envisioned by the Founders," any
believer in the original intent finds correction of the constitutional distortions
necessary.
The Reagan Administration's mission began with control of its own domain.
The Executive branch, as Kmiec writes, has powers "largely undefined by
constitutional text."3 9 The jurisdictional scope, sheer size and number of agencies
and departments within the executive branch permit diffusion of policy and
vulnerability to special interest pressure.
The return of control to the President started with Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) oversight of agency rule-making proposals. 40 The fight con-
tinued with the elimination of "legislative vetoes" in thousands of statutes through
successful arguments in a Supreme Court challenge, 4' the President's use of
34. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)(In this famous case, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney affirmed
the Constitutional right to own slaves as property.).
35. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 39.
36. Id. at 39 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 & art. I, § 9).
37. In fact, despite Kmiec's urging, Meese criticized natural law as "mysterious and uncertain."
Kmiec attributes this misguided statement to the natural law gap in Meese's legal education and to
political concerns of his staff to avoid religious connotations. Id. at 40. For a detailed examination
of Robert Bork's natural law criticism, see Kevin V. Parsons, Essay, Borkian Jurisprudence: A
Heresy of Omission, 17 J. LEGIS. 207 (1991).
38. Through the Vietnam War, the Watergate Scandal, and the weakness of the Carter Admin-
istration, the power and stature of the Presidency waned relative to its constitutionally co-equal
branches. Likewise, the regulatory powers of the states had shifted to the federal government through
preemption, the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
39. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 47.
40. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982)(establishing OMB oversight). Particularly,
the Environmental Protection Agency resisted OMB oversight with the assistance of Congress.
41. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating as ultra vires the power of the




signing statements to tighten direction and interpretation of new laws, 42 and the
assertion of executive privilege for internal workings of the executive branch. 43
While Kmiec notes the words "separation of powers" cannot be found in
the text of the Constitution, the concept has become a cornerstone of constitu-
tional jurisprudence. 44 The battle over the separation of powers occurred over
the Independent Counsel law45 and the formulation of foreign policy. Regarding
the former, Kmiec disparages the political role of the independent counsel and
the unprosecutorial nature of the investigations conducted during the Reagan
Administration. 4
The Attorney General's Lawyer also explores the tug-of-war between the
President and Congress over foreign policy powers which Kmiec finds at the root
of the Iran-Contra affair. 47 Whether an overt conflict with the President's power,
as in the War Powers Act, or a battle over the interpretation on the ambiguities
of the "Boland Amendment, '4 Kmiec finds the congressional intrusion and
subsequent vindictive prosecution by the independent counsel deplorable.
The Reagan Presidency similarly pursued a return to the traditional concept
of federalism under an original intent view. 49 The Attorney General's Lawyer
demonstrates that restoring power to the states became a test of the OLC's legal
integrity in the face of intra-party pressures on the issues of South African
divestment by state agencies and California's Proposition 65 requiring extensive
warnings on food labels.5 0 Although lobbied by conservative allies to preempt
these state actions, the Reagan Administration remained committed to its feder-
alism goal.5"
42. While not given the force of law, Kmiec asserts that the signing statements drafted by the
OLC offered publication of the President's interpretation of a law. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
LAWYER, supra note 2, at 52.
43. Id. at 63.
44. The structure of the Constitution evidences the Founders' intent for vivid delineation of
governmental branches. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)(recognizing
the constitutional power of Executive in the area of foreign policy).
45. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)(rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of
the independent counsel law, the Court upheld the law as not an ultra vires usurpation of executive
control). See generally, TERRY EASTLAND, ETHICS, POLITICS, AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL (1989).
46. Specifically, the two investigations of Meese by Independent Counsels Stein and McKay
resulted in much publicity but no charges were proffered. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra
note 2, at 13, 57-60, 197. The independent counsel would later haunt the Reagan and Bush
Administrations in the form of Judge Lawrence Walsh and the Iran-Contra probe. Kmiec's fear may
well have played out in the November 1992 when Walsh brought the indictment of former Defense
Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who was subsequently pardoned by President George Bush. See Walter
Pincus, Bush Pardons Weinberger in Iran-Contra Affair; Five Others also Cleared, WASH. POST,
Dec. 25, 1992, at Al.
47. Curtiss-Wright, supra note 44, seemed to have settled this issue, but Kmiec cites the Boland
Amendment as a typical Congressional intrusion into the President's foreign affairs powers. The
Walsh prosecution of Iran-Contra indictees became the "criminalization of separation of powers."
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 185, 187.
48. Continuing Resolution, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Sec. 8066(a), Pub. L,
No. 98-473; 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
49. Specifically, "[wihenever possible, the President wanted his departments to '[riefrain ...
from establishing uniform, national standards for programs."' Exec. Order No. 12,612, § 3(d)(2),
52 Fed. Reg. 41685 (1987); THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 137.
50. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 137.
51. See id. at 146. On the OLC's advice, though politically favoring the policy of constructive
engagement with the South African government and less federal regulation of commerce, the
Administration refused to preempt the states' actions.
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B. Social Issues
From the beginning of the Reagan Administration, the application of original
intent principles to government involvement assumed a central role in the Justice
Department's agenda on social issues. The Attorney General's Lawyer considers
the attempts by the Justice Department to "correct" legal distortions in the area
of family values, economic and civil rights.
Perhaps no single issue divides America along moral lines more than the
abortion right created in Roe v. Wade. 2 As amicus curiae, the Justice Department
of the early eighties sought to assist in the retrenchment of the rights found in
Roe. 3 Particularly critical of the judicial activism used to "find" the right, the
OLC sought to argue an original understanding of the Constitution.
Despite equivocation by the Solicitors General, the cases following Roe,
Kmiec suggests, show a trend away from the rigid trimester system of Roe, but
a continued confusion over the source and nature of the right.5 4 For Kmiec the
answer is simple, an abortion right conflicts with natural law principles and
therefore could never be considered as arising from the Constitution.
The legal campaign over abortion spilled over into the area of family planning
counseling as well. When the controversy came to the attention of the OLC,
Kmiec's research revealed that the statute, Title X of the Family Planning Act
of 1970, 5 had been misapplied for the previous seventeen years. Kmiec and his
colleagues concluded, "the legislative history makes clear that any activity that
promotes abortion as a method of family planning is prohibited .... "56 The
Supreme Court has since affirmed this reading of the act,5 7 but the issue has
reappeared in the new Clinton Administration. 8
The Meese Justice Department also battled to restore family values by
attacking pornography. The Attorney General's Commission reported several
conclusions about the primary and secondary effects of pornography on crime
and child abuse. Unexpectedly, the Commission's report revealed that the U.S.
Government at its leased property, stores and military bases was the country's
largest distributor of pornography.
52. See supra note 32.
53. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 73,77. This argument did not, however,
find automatic support from the nation's top litigators, the Solicitors General. Choosing a more
neutral path for the amici arguments, Rex Lee and later Charles Fried both skirted a true originalist
interpretation which would have completely read out the abortion right.
54. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747 (1986)(invalidating
regulations requiring physicians to provide information on non-abortion alternatives and risks as well
as record their bases for non-viability); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490
(1989)(refusing to overturn Roe but permitting regulations prohibiting uses of state facilities for
abortions as not an undue burden); and later Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791
(1992)(retaining the essential holding of Roe, but adopting in plurality an undue burden standard in
the place of the rigid trimester system).
55. Family Planning Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1992).
56. THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 87.
57. See Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S.Ct. 1759 (1991). The immediate impact of this interpretation
and the corresponding regulation restricting funds to family planning clinics generated a storm of
protest against the "gagging" of doctors and counselors who advise on abortion options.
58. The new President has drawn fire from pro-life forces and conservatives for openly refusing




The OLC accepted the task of drafting an order to end this embarrassing
predicament. Faced with the desire to limit pornography while not infringing
freedom of speech rights, the OLC working group moved quickly to find an
acceptable middle ground, despite conservative pressure to go farther.5 9 The final
draft order, which Kmiec regrets winning, was an executive order which "rid
federal establishments of obscenity and child pornography and prohibit the display
or dissemination to minors of sexually explicit material."
6
Similarly, The Attorney General's Lawyer considers the issue of improving
education. Believing strongly that the improvement of student performance begins
at home, the Reagan Administration took up the cause of the voucher system to
give parents the opportunity to choose where to send their tax dollars to support
their children's education. 61
Kmiec offered two reasons to explain why this system failed. First, perhaps
too convenient and too cynically, he asserts the political strength of the teachers'
unions blocked extensive consideration of the plan. Kmiec refutes out-of-hand
the unions' argument that public schools would be left as a 'dumping ground'
for problem children," casting this as "highly insulting to public school teach-
ers." ' 62 He maintains instead, that localizing school management through a voucher
system is an "empower[ing]" tool for inner-city parents and will improve public
schools. 63
The second hurdle to the Reagan voucher system lay in the inevitable fact
that sectarian schools may end up receiving the vouchers. The separation of
church and state under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment creates
a large judicial hurdle. When presented with this dilemma, Kmiec decided to
abandon the previous OLC positions opposing a voucher system and to "start
from the ground up." Although facially a blatant exercise in revisionism by
Kmiec, he offers credibly that the confused direction of the Court on the
Establishment Clause required a fresh look.
The new inquiry considered by the OLC examined the often misused three
pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman.65 Kmiec submits evidence that the original
intent of the clause, particularly in light of its sister Free Exercise Clause, is to
ban governmental religious coercion, not to force governmental neutrality on
religion." Under this interpretation, a tuition voucher system could pass a "no
coercion" test.67
59. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 90. While Kmiec personally agreed
with the conservatives' arguments for including soft-porn, the confused nature of the case law defining
obscenity required the less restrictive order.
60. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 90.
61. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's LAWYER, supra note 2, at 100. By creating a choice, the parent
would presumably become more interested and involved.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 101.
64. Id.
65. 403 U.S. 602 (1971)(the test's three prongs are: 1) government assistance must have a secular
purpose; 2) the assistance must be completely neutral as to religion; and 3) it does not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion). Kmiec criticizes heavily this "mechanical" balancing act for
failing to draw a consistent line.
66. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 104.
67. Although the Court did not clear matters in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (1992), it does
appear to be moving away from the Lemon test for religious neutrality. However, the final voice on
[Vol. 19:311
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Also at the center of natural law theory, economic rights appear prominently
in the Constitution. The right to own property and freedom to contract were
given special protection by the Framers. 68 These rights, eroded by years of
expanded Congressional and state regulation, found ready allies in the originalist
camp of the Meese Justice Department.
Kmiec finds the right to own property at the forefront of natural rights. As
an essential element of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," the property
right, like other economic rights, had been relegated to a second tier of consti-
tutionally protected rights, below political and civil freedoms. 69 In the name of
the environment, zoning and regulation of interstate commerce, court decisions
have diminished the property rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
The protection of property interests, found specifically in the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, 70 strengthened this "natural" right by creating a
Constitutional remedy of just compensation for governmental intrusion. However,
the effect of judicial lawmaking had reduced this remedy repeatedly until, as
Kmiec charges, the clause rarely applied to less than actual physical occupation
of the property."
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,72 the test case for the Takings
Clause during Kmiec's term at OLC, became the vehicle for rehabilitating the
Takings Clause. 73 The Court's decision that the requirement of a public beach
access was clearly a "taking" of the Nollan's property deserving just compensation
as authorized by the Fifth Amendment shows a clear departure from the preceding
years of lower standards of review for property and other economic rights, such
as the freedom of contract. 74
Finally, the Meese Justice Department received heavy criticism for its appli-
cation of original intent in the area of civil rights. To Attorney General Meese
and his Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, William Bradford Reynolds,
the Constitution is "colorblind." Although sidetracked early on,75 this application
of the original intent saw prominence in the OLC's advice on race and employment
issues .76
the voucher system was that of Congress, and it died a quiet death. See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
LAWYER, supra note 2, at 106.
68. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's LAWYER, supra note 2, at 115.
69. Id.
70. U.S. CONST. art. V.
71. See, e.g., Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)(holding that
the "landmarking" of plaintiff's building did not constitute a taking) and Yee v. Escondido, 112 S.
Ct. 1522 (1992)(holding city's rent control ordinance did not constitute a taking of the owner's
mobile home park).
72. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
73. Largely, Scalia adopted the same arguments as Kmiec's OLC advice. See THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL's LAWYER, supra note 2, at 125.
74. The return to original understanding of the contracts clause, urged by Kmiec, was only
partially confirmed by a more recent decision in General Motors v. Romein, 112 S.Ct. 1105
(1992)(holding that a retroactive provision of the Michigan workers compensation law did not violate
the contracts or due process clauses under a rational basis test).
75. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (the Department lost its opposition
to Internal Revenue's elimination of the tax-exempt status for Bob Jones University based on the
school's rules against inter-racial dating, under the Free Exercise Clause).
76. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 155.
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Carrying out the color-blind argument, which is arguably supported by
natural law, 77 Kmiec favored Court scrutiny that focused on the intent to
discriminate over discriminatory effects. 7s Turning the criticism of Plessy on its
head, Kmiec deplores the firmly entrenched judicial activism of affirmative
action,7 9 as he would any intentionally disparate treatment under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection clauses.80
Although not categorized as a civil rights issue by Kmiec, the treatment of
AIDS patients under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 also arrived
at the OLC's doorstep.8' Taking up the issue, Kmiec, through consultations with
the Surgeon General, found the scientific evidence of transmission of the disease
through casual contact inconclusive, but tending to imply strong medical impair-
ment from the contagion.8 2 Kmiec's opinion letter ultimately permitted extension
of the Act's protection for people with AIDS.8 3
C. Ethics and Resignation
The report of Independent Counsel McKay and its publicized conclusions on
the "Wedtech" affair 4 resulted in a bitter ending to the years of striving for a
consistent jurisprudence at the Department of Justice. Injured by the press and
in-house defections, a loss of public confidence finally forced Meese to resign.85
The lame-duck Attorney General sought unsuccessfully in the interim to turn
the Independent Counsel law on Congress itself, with the OLC's help.8 6 After
77. And notably supported by the Senior Mr. Justice Harlan in his Plessy v. Ferguson dissent,
163 U.S. 537 (1896)(the dissent argued for a "color-blind" Constitution which guarantees civil liberties
to all citizens, black or white as the only reading of the Constitution).
78. The Supreme Court seemed to temper its prior discriminatory effects language in Wards
Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), by requiring complainants to specifically identify a
non-business purpose for discrimination. The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned that
retrenchment, however.
79. Opposing the "quota" systems, which later plagued the Bush Administration, Kmiec similarly
disapproved of "affirmative action" programs. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at
167.
80. Criticism of the "benign" discrimination encouraged by Justices Brennan and Marshall found
a voice in the Court's clarification in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989)(rejecting general societal discrimination as the basis for racial preferences in city contract
awards).
81. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 92.
82. Drawing from the test of School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), requiring the
complainant to be both handicapped and contagious, Kmiec sought the Surgeon General's opinion
on whether the contagiousness of the AIDS infection was a medical impairment even though the
HIV positive carrier displays no outward signs of the disease. The answer was effectively, "yes."
See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 97.
83. Kmiec leaves himself open to criticism for choosing not to recuse himself from the issue.
Although morally opposed to extending such protection to a distinction based largely on "life-style"
choices, Kmiec concluded that protecting homosexuals from government employment discrimination
did not promote homosexuality, therefore avoiding a moral conflict. See id. at 98.
84. At its root the Wedtech scandal accused the Attorney General of influence peddling in the
award of contracts to his friend, E. Robert Wallach, and investment conflicts. See THE ATtORNEY
GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 195.
85. For a less "loyal" account, see Ruth Marcus, Meese Announces Resignation, Says Probe
'Vindicated' Him, WASH. POST, July 6, 1988, at Al. See also EASTLAND, supra note 45.
86. The proposal, later shelved by the Bush White House, created a modified independent
counsel within the Justice Department to investigate congressional wrong-doing, but within the limits
of the Department's strict prosecutorial policies and the Attorney General's supervision. See THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 199.
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Clearing Away the Caricature
Meese's departure and the election of George Bush, the White House continued
the call for fairness in ethics and convened a Commission on Federal Ethics Law
Reform.87 After receiving the Commission's findings, Bush assigned Kmiec and
the OLC the task of drafting the reform legislation s. 8
III. CONCLUSION
As a story of the warfare waged by the Meese Justice Department against
the "arbitrary" judicial activism of previous decades, The Attorney General's
Lawyer is admittedly a biased view. As a friend and loyal lieutenant of the
Attorney General, Douglas Kmiec offers this side of story because it was never
told before. As Kmiec describes, the book is the "Meese footnote."8' 9
Though few are spared Kmiec's legal criticism, including Meese, a commit-
ment to a singular jurisprudence emerges as the clear theme of The Attorney
General's Lawyer. Kmiec manages a constructive approach in selling the juris-
prudence with good-natured humor, even including faint praise for a nemesis,
retired Justice William Brennan. 90 Kmiec carries this personal tone as if giving a
friendly interview in his office at Notre Dame Law School.
Ultimately, The Attorney General's Lawyer provides a timely lesson on the
office of U.S. Attorney General. In the early months of a Clinton Presidency,
the Justice Department has been without leadership. 91 Ethics charges and scan-
dalous rumors have plagued early nominees and candidates alike. In addition,
confronted by pugnacious issues of abortion counseling and homosexuals in the
military, the Clinton Administration's Attorney General would do well to learn
the benefits of a consistent jurisprudential program, even in the face of intense
political and media attacks.
Martin John Heli*
87. Id. at 211, citing THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ETHICS LAW REFORM, To SERVE
WITH HONOR (1989).
88. THE ATTORNEY GEN ERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 2, at 214. While George Bush signed some
of these reforms into law, Congress managed to evade scrutiny by independent counsel and restrictions
on that office.
89. Id. at 220.
90. E.g. "[It is surely anti-intellectual to believe that every opinion issued above a Brennan
signature is automatically incorrect." THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 1, at 122.
91. See John W. Mashek, Clinton Chooses Florida Prosecutor for Justice Post, BOST. GLOBE,
Feb. 12, 1993, at 1.
* B.S.F.S., Georgetown University, 1988; J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law
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